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CRITICAL LEGAL BISHOPS: ROBERTO UNGER, THE
CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
GERARD F. POWERS*
The second draft of the bishops' pastoral letter on the
economy calls for a new "experiment in securing economic
rights."' The bishops assert that "economic rights should be
granted a status in the cultural and legal traditions of this na-
tion analogous to that held by the civil and political rights to
freedom of religion, speech, and assembly." 2 This assertion
of the importance of economic rights provides substance to
the normative demands of a "preferential option for the
poor." s While it has descriptive and hortatory meaning,4 as a
principle of distributive justice,5 the option for the poor gives
* A.B. 1980, Princeton University; J.D., M.A. 1986, University of
Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-86.
1. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy (Second Draft) para. 96, reprinted in 15 ORIGINs 257
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Second Draft].
2. Id. para. 85. The bishops are less concerned with precisely how
rights are guaranteed than they are that a libertarian ideology that rejects
the notion that human rights include economic rights be put to rest. Id.
para. 86.
3. Id. paras. 59, 88-94.
4. An option for the poor is descriptive in referring to the
Church's institutional commitment to work with and minister to the poor.
It is hortatory in calling for two forms of Christian charity. The first, vol-
untarism, calls for donations of money, time and talent to those in need. Id.
para. 116. The second, asceticism, calls for both a voluntary poverty that is
a sign of solidarity with the poor and a voluntary renunciation of legal
rights that prevents equality before the law from becoming a guise for ex-
ploitation and discrimination. Id. para. 89.
5. Id. para. 88. Professor Rodes argues that the preferential option
for the poor is an "ascetic principle," rather than a moral one: "[I]t would
seem that in theory anyone who does impartial justice between rich and
poor is doing all that moral philosophy can ask. On the other hand, experi-
ence teaches that if we set out to be impartial between rich and poor we
will end up favoring the rich. . . . As Pope Paul II (sic) reminds us:
If, beyond legal rules, there is really no deeper feeling of respect
for and service to others, then even equality before the law can
serve as an excuse for flagrant discrimination, continued exploita-
tion and actual contempt.
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priority to meeting basic necessities' and increasing the par-
ticipation of the poor in economic life.
7
Some claim that the bishops' specific policy proposals
designed to protect economic rights reflect their liberal Dem-
ocratic backgrounds more than their holy offices.' This arti-
cle argues, however, that any apparent partisanship reflected
in their practical proposals derives not from any Democratic
agenda, but rather from religious and ethical principles that
call into question important aspects of the American eco-
nomic, social and legal system. In particular, these religious
and ethical principles reflect a theory of distributive and eco-
nomic justice that is in considerable tension with the classical
liberal tenets of much of mainstream jurisprudence in the
United States today. This tension suggests the need to de-
velop an alternative jurisprudence-an American Catholic ju-
risprudence. Such a jurisprudence will enable the bishops and
the Catholic laity more coherently and credibly to promote
and engage in dialogue concerning the development of legal
principles and legislative programs designed to protect eco-
nomic rights."
In other words, we are faced with a paradox. The preferential option for
the poor is not a principle of justice, but we cannot hope to do them justice
without it." R. Rodes, paper presented at University of Santa Clara (Febru-
ary 23, 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
Two points should be made here. First, the notion that equality before
the law can be a mask for and means of maintaining inequality and injus-
tice is a common theme of Unger and other critical legal scholars. Second,
the bishops would not accept Rodes' assertion that the option for the poor
is not a principle of justice or morality. They see it as a matter of charity,
like Rodes, but also as a matter of distributive justice, arising out of need,
community or restitution for past injustices. Second Draft, supra note 1,
paras. 76-77.
6. Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 78, 92. For the most detailed
list of specific rights, see John XXIII, Peace on Earth (Pacem in Terris) nos.
11-27 (1963); John Paul 11, On Human Work (Laborem Exercens) nos. 18-19
(1981).
7. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 93.
8. See, e.g., Greeley, The Bishops and the Economy: A "Radical" Dis-
sent, AMERICA Jan. 5-12, 1985, at 19; Greenwald, Am I My Brother's Keeper?,
TIME, Nov. 26, 1984, at 80, 82; Hitchcock, Two Views on the Economy, CA-
THOLICISM IN CRISIS, Feb. 1985, at 7, 9; Spaeth, Relying on Government, CA-
THOLICISM IN CRIsIS, Feb. 1985, at 12. In fact, the bishops' failure to cri-
tique capitalism in a more explicit and radical manner, in contrast to
Unger's "total critique" of the liberal ethos, might be explained as the dif-
ference between a merely holy office and an endowed chair.
9. This article does not attempt to establish the need for an Ameri-
can Catholic jurisprudence nor does it outline what such a jurisprudence
might look like. Some brief points are in order, however. First, the pastoral
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This article suggests that the critical legal studies move-
ment (CLS), '0 particularly as represented by Roberto Un-
ger's jurisprudence, 1 provides a somewhat unlikely but po-
tentially fruitful source for the development of this American
Catholic jurisprudence. Unger, one of the founders of the
critical legal studies movement, criticizes basic tenets of classi-
cal liberalism and calls for a revamping of American law that
would include the recognition of basic economic rights." In-
letter and previous NCCB documents suggest, implicitly and explicitly, nu-
merous legal reforms. See, e.g., Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 80, 199
(progressive taxation); id. para. 210 (national eligibility standards and a na-
tional minimum benefit level for public assistance); id. para. 291 (plant clos-
ing legislation). See generally PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES
CATHOLIC BISHOPS 1792-1983 (H. Nolan ed. 1984); J. BENESTAD, THE PUR-
SUIT OF A JUST SOCIAL ORDER: POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, 1966-80 (1982). Such reforms, however, are not derived from a
systematic analysis of legal doctrines or jurisprudential theories. For examr
pie, the pastoral letter cites to few legal sources and was written with little
input from legal scholars or practitioners. Second, a systematic jurispru-
dence is necessary if the bishops or lay Catholics are to engage in a credible
reading of the "signs of the times," that is, are to do competent social and
legal analysis. The idea of an "option for the poor," for example, cannot
be discussed without an understanding of its relationship to equal protec-
tion analysis. Third, law is an important language of society and has a sig-
nificant• educative function. The bishops must be able to translate general
ethical principles into legal terms if the social teachings are to be under-
stood, respected, and effective. The relationship between economic and le-
gal rights- is unclear in the pastoral letter-and in the Church's social
teachings generally-causing considerable confusion. The bishops' call for
the development of a cultural consensus that the poor have economic
rights cannot be discussed intelligently without analyzing the role of law in
developing and effectuating such a consensus.
10. For an overview of the critical legal studies movement, see Note,
Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982).
11. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) [hereinafter cited
as KNOWLEDGE]; R. UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY (1977) [hereinafter
cited as LAW]; R. UNGER, PASSION (1984) [hereinafter cited as PASSION]; Un-
ger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as CLS].
12. Unger's project is to explore "the impoverished assumptions of
contemporary jurisprudential practice" by reimmersion in philosophy.
Hutchinson & Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff. Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62
TEX. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (1984). According to Hutchinson and Monahan,
"Unger's relation to the dominant tradition in contemporary philosophy is
ambiguous. He is obviously an unstinting and resolute critic of modern lib-
eralism . . . . Yet, in seeking to displace contemporary liberal thought,
Unger offers a reconstituted 'superliberalism' that pushes liberal premises
about freedom and liberation to their outermost limits." Id. at 1493.
Admittedly, Unger is less concerned than the bishops with specific issues
of distributive and social justice. Nevertheless, distributive issues play, at
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terestingly, Unger, who has been called the "Christ figure"
of CLS," claims that his allegedly radical jurisprudence "4 is,
in fact, "very Catholic."' 5
While this article arises from the perceived need to de-
velop a jurisprudence compatible with the Church's social
teachings, particularly those relating to economic rights and
distributive justice, it is not a jurisprudential article in any
strict sense. It intends only to analyze the framework, the
most basic theoretical issues, on which the bishops and Unger
must agree if Unger's jurisprudence is to be valuable to those
interested in relating Catholic social teachings to American
law. Fortunately, this limited project fits well with the bish-
ops' and Unger's own concerns. Both the bishops and Unger
suggest that a revision of liberal democratic theory is re-
quired.'6 Both are more interested in a theoretical critique of
the American legal and economic system than they are with
specific policies or practices.
This article is limited, therefore, to a comparison of the
bishops' and Unger's respective theories of distributive jus-
tice, particularly as they relate to the right to basic necessi-
ties. Due to the breadth of this comparison, it will not at-
tempt to provide any systematic critique of their positions.
For the same reason, even the description and comparison of
their theories will be necessarily brief. Such a sketch, how-
ever, shows that, while they diverge at important points, they
converge on several principles underlying their theories of
least implicitly, an important role in Unger's work, but they certainly are
not his major concern.
13. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36
STAN. L. REV. 413, 416 (1984).
14. One legal scholar has suggested that Unger and other critical
legal scholars are "unassimilable and irritating foreign substances in the
body of the law school." Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship,
90 YALE L. J. 1113, 1128 (1981).
15. Kronman, Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 167, 200 app. (1976).
16. The tone of the second draft is more positive than the first, and
even the first draft only hinted at any systematic critique of the liberal
democratic ethos. See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic So-
cial Teaching and the U.S. Economy (First Draft) paras. 82-83, reprinted in 14
ORIGINS 337 (1984) [hereinafter cited as First Draft]. Nevertheless, particu-
larly to the extent that the U.S. economy is based on primarily individualis-
tic and utilitarian values associated with classical or neo-classical liberal eco-
nomic theory, this critique is implicit in both the first and second drafts of
the pastoral letter. For a more detailed explanation of this point, see infra,
notes 19-30, 53-62 and accompanying text. Unger's entire project is to




distributive justice. These areas of common understanding
warrant further exploration of their overall compatibility.
Part I analyzes the theory of distributive justice and its
relation to the common good implied by the bishops' and
Unger's theories of economic rights. It suggests that the bish-
ops and Unger begin with a shared understanding of the so-
cial aspects of human nature and the conception of the com-
mon good as distinct from the mere sum of individual
interests. More particularly, they share deep theories of
human dignity and community that explain the priority of
the right to basic necessities, the importance of participation
as both an instrumental and substantive norm, the qualified
nature of property, and the relationship between the princi-
ple of need and economic equality. Despite these general con-
vergences, in contrast to the bishops' largely objective specifi-
cation of the demands of distributive justice, Unger's
skepticism leads him to rely far more on moral intuition and
moral consensus as normative for the social order. Further-
more, Unger is considerably more egalitarian than the bish-
ops, due to his close linkage of knowledge of the good and
human development to economic, social and political
domination.
Part II relates the bishops' and Unger's theories of dis-
tributive justice to their theories of the proper role of gov-
ernment. The bishops and Unger converge to the extent that
they stress subsidiarity, or its equivalent, encourage forms of
economic democracy, recognize the importance of the politi-
cal in human nature, and challenge minimalist theories of
government that deny its important moral function in taking
positive action to ensure distributive justice. They diverge,
however, to the extent that Unger is willing to institutional-
ize economic rights, open nearly all of life to political con-
flict, and regularly destabilize the social, economic, and legal
order.
I. ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The bishops' and Unger's concern with economic rights
may be understood in the context of their broader theories
of distributive justice. Underlying their theories of distribu-
tive justice, in turn, are two more fundamental theories that
correspond to the individual and social aspects of human na-
ture: the theories of human dignity and transcendence and
the theories of community. Their interpretations of these
theories of individual human dignity and community are re-
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flected in their positions on the more concrete issues of dis-
tributive justice that define their theories of economic rights.
Three of these issues are particularly important: the right to
basic necessities and its relation to property rights generally;
the question of human perfection; and the relationship be-
tween economic equality and community.
A. Fundaniental Theories
1. The Bishops
The bishops' theory of distributive justice begins with
the broader concept of the common good. The Second Vati-
can Council defined the common good as "the sum of those
conditions of social life which allow social groups and their
individual members relatively thorough and ready access to
their own fulfillment."17 The common good evaluates social
and economic structures first in terms of their ability to pro-
mote human dignity, and second in terms of human solidaris-
tic equality. Therefore, the bishops' conceptions of human
dignity and solidarity constitute the foundations, the funda-
mental theories, underlying their theory of distributive jus-
tice. Both start from the basic proposition that human dignity
and social solidarity are inseparable. Because they are insepa-
rable, collaboration and mutual interdependence, not conflict
or individualism, are necessary to achieve the common good.
a. Human Dignity
The first theory defines the common good as the con-
sciously developed complex of structures and organizations
that facilitate realization of human dignity.'8 The important
aspect of this focus on individual human dignity, and the cor-
responding human rights and duties, is that, unlike more lib-
ertarian notions of rights, it is grounded, not only in the
equal dignity of the individual before God, but also in the
transcendent dignity of the individual as a member of the
human community, that is, as a social being. 9 Therefore, the
17. Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World (Gaudium et Spes) no. 26 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Gaudium
et Spesl.
18. D. HOLLENBACH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT 55 (1979) ("Pius XI's use of
the notion of social justice ... indicates the emergence of a new sensitivity
in Catholic thought to the possibility of conscious institutional change.")
19. Fhe bishops' notion that, to a significant degree, rights are de-
rived from and realized in community differs from the liberal notion that
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bishops' theory of human rights is based on the relational
quality of human dignity; human rights and thus human dig-
nity are realized and protected only by nurturing and
strengthening the bonds of solidarity.20 Certain human rights
are inviolable, but not in an individualistic or libertarian
sense. Rather, human rights are realized only in a moral com-
munity of mutual interdependence; instead of claiming rights
against other individuals or against the community, one real-
izes individual human rights by building and reinforcing com-
munity. At the same time, building active participation in
community is a primary reason to protect individual rights.2
Therefore, it is the right to a minimum level of participation
as a member of a community that is the foundation of the
right to basic necessities, to meaningful work, and to other
rights are derived from individual autonomy and realized against others or
the state. This does not mean that the bishops ignore the Hohfeldian tru-
ism that all rights must have corresponding duties. The bishops do outline
the various duties of different societal actors. See Second Draft, supra note
1, paras. 97-122. The bishops differ with liberalism, however, in their rec-
ognition that rights can be protected only if all persons participate to some
degree in forming a moral community that promotes the common good.
Like liberalism, one has rights because one is an individual human being;
unlike liberalism, one has rights also because one is a member of the com-
munity. Id. para. 76. It is in this sense that one has rights in community.
Since liberalism denies the possibility of such a moral community and com-
mon good, rights take on a different, more individualistic character for it.
See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). The liberal notion
of rights easily results in the disintegration, rather than the promotion, of
community. Compare the discussion of individualistic versus communal no-
tions of rights and the move away from rights language by many critical
legal scholars, see A Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363
(1984). In particular, see CLS, supra note 11, at 597.
Unger parallels the bishops in viewing rights in terms of community. He
argues that communal life, with its concern for mutual interdependence, is
"incompatible" with the liberal conception of a right as "a loaded gun that
the rightholder may shoot at will in his corner of town. Outside that cor-
ner the other licensed gunmen may shoot him down." Id. According to
Unger, the rights and obligations arising out of mutual interdependence
cannot be limited to "perfected acts of will (e.g., the fully formalized, bilat-
eral executory contract) or the unilateral imposition . . . by the state," as
in the liberal conception. Id. Alternatively, Unger proposes solidarity
rights, "the legal entitlements of communal life," which would involve an
expanded notion of good faith and reliance. Id. at 600. See also infra note
67 and accompanying text.
20. Christiansen, Morality and Public Policy: Defining Domestic Pri-
orities 14 (unpublished paper presented at Third Annual Jewish-Catholic
Dialogue on Social Policy, Univ. of Notre Dame, June 2-4, 1981).
21. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 83; D. HOLLENBACH, supra note
18, at 65-68.
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civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.22
b. Human Solidaristic Equality
The theory of human solidaristic equality is related to
this recognition of the social aspects of human dignity.
Human solidaristic equality presents a theological reaffirma-
tion of a communitarian ideal of social life, an ideal in direct
tension with aspects of liberal individualism.2" Liberal indi-
vidualism ignores the social aspects of human nature. It fails
to recognize the existence of a common good distinct from
and greater than the sum of individual interests, but consid-
ers "social solidarities as more or less automatic consequences
of individual initiatives, not as an aim and a major criterion
of the value of social organization."'" Human solidaristic
22. D. HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 65.
23. The social welfare theory is a popular example of this liberal
individualism. It views society as an artificial construct defined by the utili-
tarian balancing of individual interests. It derives from moral skepticism
and rational egoism in the theory of knowledge and a primarily individual-
istic concept of human nature. Moral skepticism rejects the traditional
Catholic concept of a universal and objective truth and adopts the notion
of the individuality and subjectivity of knowledge. Communal values do not
exist independently of the sum of individual interests or preferences. Ethi-
cal egoism asserts that one's primary moral obligation is to seek one's own
advantage, whether identified with happiness or pleasure, with knowledge,
power, or self-realization, or with altruism, defined as enlightened self in-
terest. This skepticism and egoism leads to a search for neutral principles
in decision-making: the market in economics, economic efficiency or proce-
dural formalism in law, and the separation of powers in politics. Morality,
supra note 20, at 8-10. The economic analysis jurisprudence is one of the
more influential legal philosophies that is unabashedly based on a skeptical
and egoistic epistemology. See, e.g., Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985) ("Ethical arguments .. .
provide rationalizations for ethical positions taken on emotional grounds."
Id. at 90. For example, to Posner's "wealth maximizer, altruism is neither
good nor bad .... ." Id. at 103). For a general discussion of moral skepti-
cism and rational egoism, see W. FRANKENNA, ETHICS 17-20 (2d ed. 1973).
The Lay Letter adopts rational egoism, suggesting that "self-interest
rightly understood" will lead the rich to assist the poor, and thereby result
in the common good. Lay Commission on Catholic Social Teaching and
the U.S. Economy, Toward the Future: Catholic Social Thought and the U.S.
Economy, CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS, Nov. 1984, at 1, 18, 26 [hereinafter cited
as Lay Letter]. Admittedly, the Lay Letter does not claim that this enlight-
ened self-interest is a moral system; it claims it is only an economic system.
In doing so, however, it either denies what it later asserts-that virtue is
integral to and is actually promoted by capitalism-or it subsumes all no-
tions of distributive justice into the realm of "heroic virtue" or charity. Id.
at 17. The bishops would categorically reject both of these propositions.
24. Paul VI, A Call to Action (Octogesima Adveniens) no. 26 (1971).
[Vol. 2
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equality suggests that "the controlling insight of the [Catho-
lic] social doctrine is that socioeconomic developments ought
to bring about community between social groups. Alter-
nately, they ought not to increase the differences between
them." 5 According to Drew Christiansen, in the last twenty
years Catholic social teaching has encouraged the creation of
social structures which " 'form anew fraternal relationships'
through a more equitable sharing of material goods and so-
cial resources."26 Populorum Progressio specified "duties of sol-
idarity," which enjoin those with power to use their resources
to create a community with the poor, a community that is
currently lacking given large differences in wealth and power
in the world.17 These duties of solidarity are elements of the
Catholic concept of social justice.18 The important insight
here is that community is essential for human dignity, and
this community is impossible without at least relative eco-
nomic equality. Solidarity, which focuses on the material con-
ditions necessary for this community, combines with charity,
This criticism of excessive individualism is balanced with a recognition of
the important role liberal individualism assigns to personal initiative and
development as well as to civil and political rights. The bishops clearly rec-
ognize the importance of these values, see, e.g., Second Draft, supra note 1,
para. 85, but oppose the idealized and ideological liberal individualism,
grounded in the 18th and 19th century classical writers, that ignores the
social aspects of human nature. According to Paul VI, "at the very root of
philosophical liberalism is an erroneous affirmation of the autonomy of the
individual in his activity, his motivation and the exercise of his liberty." Id.
at no. 35. Compare the analysis of individualism in American culture in R.
BEII.AH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER, S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
25. Christiansen, On Relative Equality: Catholic Egalitarianism After
Vatican II, 45 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 651, 655 n.6 (1984).
26. Id. at 654 (quoting Paul VI).
27. Id. at 663 (citing Paul VI, On the Development of Peoples
(Populorum Progressio) nos. 43-55 (1967)).
28. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 75. The social nature of man
and the focus on participation grounds not only rights, but also duties. In-
dividuals and institutions have a duty, arising out of social justice, "to or-
ganize economic and social institutions so that people can contribute to so-
ciety in ways which respect their freedom and the dignity of their labor."
Id. In other words, individuals have both a right and duty to participate in
society, to work. Similarly, individuals and institutions have a duty of stew-
ardship, by which the bishops mean that one "should regard one's lawful
possessions not merely as one's own but also as common property in the
sense that they should accrue to the benefit not only of oneself but of
others." First Draft, supra note 16, para. 119 (quoting Gaudium et Spes,
supra note 17, no. 69). Individuals also have duties of charity, which in-
clude a willingness, if need be, to renounce some of their rights for the
good of others. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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which fosters personal and spiritual attitudes essential to com-
munity, to form a theological system by which to analyze
society.29
2. Unger
Unger's theory of distributive justice reflects his larger
project of forging a third way between liberal individualism
and collectivism.3 0 Unger parallels the bishops in grounding
his theory of distributive justice in what he calls "authentic
human nature." 31 He defines the common good as the social
and political conditions that allow for "the manifestation and
development of individual and universal human nature.
'32
This notion of the common good, and the subsidiary theory
of distributive justice, may be understood in terms of two
more fundamental theories: the theory of human transcen-
dence and the theory of a community of purpose. These the-
ories correspond to the bishops' foundational theories of
human dignity and solidaristic equality.
a. Human Transcendence
Unger's theory of human transcendence rests on an epis-
temology and anthropology that are more skeptical and exis-
tential than the bishops' theory of human dignity. Rather
than a notion of human dignity from which various fairly spe-
cific and objective universal human rights are derived, includ-
29. Christiansen, supra note 25, at 665.
30. In criticizing liberalism, neither the bishops nor Unger suppose
that the solution to liberalism's inadequacies is to turn it on its head and
adopt its opposing principles. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 7. They do not
dispense with liberalism's support of individual liberties. But both see this
very strength of liberalism to be its major weakness. They seek to intro-
duce other important values that liberalism either excludes or militates
against, namely: a coherent notion of the individual and common good and
a recognition of the social aspects of human nature.
31. Unger's iheory of community is based on a number of crucial
assumptions:
The first assumption is that there is a unitary human nature,
though one that changes and develops in history. The second pre-
mise is that this human nature constitutes the final basis of moral
judgment in the absence of objective values and in the silence of
revelation. The third assumption is that there might be certain po-
litical conditions under which an ever more inclusive sharing of
ends in space and time would carry weight as an indication of the
nature of man.
Id. at 221.
32. Id. at 239.
[Vol. 2
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ing the right to basic necessities, Unger's human transcen-
dence embraces a subjectivity, relativity, and historicity that
Catholic social teaching has only recently begun to recog-
nize. 33 Because of this contingency, Unger speaks less in
terms of a catalog of human rights and more in terms of the
existential and subjective development of the individual.
Reflecting his skepticism, Unger's norm of human tran-
scendence suggests that all social theories and practices limit
human potential because all are socially and historically con-
tingent and only partially reflect and enhance true human na-
ture. According to Unger, it is not possible to fully ascertain
either the normative demands of human nature or the social
and political institutions that might approximate these de-
mands.3 ' Reflecting his existentialism, Unger asserts that all
contexts can be broken because personality has an infinite
quality that allows it "to transcend the limited imaginative
and social worlds that it constructs.""6 But Unger's is a "soft"
33. Unger specifically rejects traditional Catholic notions of objec-
tive value or intelligible essences. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 76-81;
CLS, supra note 11, at 661. Noonan suggests, however, that, while Unger
claims to reject intelligible essences, he brings them back in again by speak-
ing of common purposes, which, Noonan claims, "is to consider the human
essence under the aspect of final causality. To use human nature as a crite-
rion requires an idea of what human nature is." Noonan labels this a "neo-
Thomist" perspective. Noonan, Book Review, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 194, 198
(1976). But see Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1530, suggesting
that Unger shares some aspects of a Marxist notion of human nature.
Noonan's conclusion is reasonable with respect to Knowledge and Politics
but Unger's Passion and "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" indicate a
more clearly skeptical position that is not neo-Thomist. While Unger dis-
tances himself from radical existentialism he admits to be closer to existen-
tialism than to Aristotelianism, a foundation of Thomist thought. CLS,
supra note 11, at 662.
Of course, the Thomist and neo-Thomist notions of objective value and
an essential human nature have undergone significant reinterpretation. See
infra note 56. Despite these developments, Unger is significantly more
skeptical than the bishops. He embraces subjectivity, relativity, and histo-
ricity; the bishops tolerate them. But theological reinterpretations, such as
Rahner's combination of essentialism and personalism (true human nature,
the good, is discovered through individual freedom), resonate with Unger's
brand of existentialism and may indicate a potential for convergence be-
tween the bishops and Unger. See J. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND ROMAN
CATHOLIC ETHICS 92-93 (1978) (discussing Rahner's treatment of existen-
tialist and essentialist ethics).
34. PASSION, supra note 11, at 48.
35. CLS, supra note 11, at 587. See also PASSION, supra note 11, at 8.
Unger's context-transcending personality parallels the humanistic psycholo-
gists, such as Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Erich Fromm, who re-
present an alternative to psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Hutchinson &
19851
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skepticism and a qualified existentialism." On the one hand,
he claims that although social constructs are contingent, they
must be preserved. On the other hand, he asserts that society
must continually revise these social constructs in order to
more fully develop human potential. 7 According to Unger,
the preservation of existing arrangements provides insights
which serve as the starting point for a fuller understanding of
authentic human nature and a corresponding revision of so-
cial, economic and political institutions. In other words,
human personality is both context-transcending and imagina-
tive, but within a "stable context of allegiances." 8
While the bishops are foremost concerned with revising
institutions to meet basic needs and other prerequisites for
human dignity, Unger is more concerned with meeting basic
needs and establishing greater economic equality so that the
Monahan, supra note 12, at 1535.
36. Unger does not accept the skeptical notion that all values are
merely individual and subjective. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 102. Ac-
cording to Unger, pure subjectivity of value does not correspond with
human experience, an experience that he claims is reflected in continuing
moral and political controversy over objective truth and that is known
through "reflective self-scrutiny." PASSION, supra note 11, at 3. This "re-
flective self-scrutiny" seeks to avoid indeterminacy while achieving univer-
sality, much like Rawls' "reflective equilibrium." See Hutchinson &
Monahan, supra note 12, at 1531 n.256.
Unger's "soft skepticism" synthesizes the Aristotelian or Thomistic no-
tion of objective value and the classical liberal or radical existential forms
of ethical egoism. As a "soft" skeptic, he asserts that some values and insti-
tutions better reflect human nature-which he claims equals the
good-than others. Unlike radical existentialism, his soft skepticism ac-
cepts historical and social contingencies as starting points for ascertaining
and developing fundamental aspects of human nature, without claiming a
secure metaphysical basis for moral claims, but merely one that "escape[s]
the most devastating skepticism." PASSION, supra note 11, at 52.
Also unlike radical existentialism, the recognition of historical and social
contingencies does not lead Unger to adopt a purely negative conception
of freedom. According to Unger, freedom requires social and institutional
contexts; it has a positive content, but this content is not limited by these
necessary constraints. CLS, supra note 11, at 661-62. Freedom and self-ac-
tualization are not the same as a Nietzschean self-reliance. They are not
the absence of all dependencies, but are the acceptance of mutual vulnera-
bility in the context of faith, hope, and forgiving love. This freedom and
empowerment is achieved only through changes in both personal relations
and social institutions. PASSION, supra note 11, at 72-76.
37. CLS, supra note 11, at 585. For a discussion of the way Unger
uses love to resolve the problem of the relationship between contextuality
and community, see Weinrib, Enduring Passion (Book Review), 94 YALE L. J.
1825 (1985).
38. CLS, supra note 11, at 584-85.
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revised institutions do not reflect existing patterns of domina-
tion. According to Unger, the lack of basic necessities and
economic inequality manifest forms of institutional domina-
tion that militate against individual and collective empower-
ment, or human transcendence and community. 9 That is, ec-
onomic equality-and the correlative need principle-are
necessary, though not sufficient, to escape domination and
contingency, develop community, and thereby better under-
stand and realize human potential.4 0 Economic equality is an
important factor in beginning what Unger calls the spiral
from domination to community.41
b. Community of Purpose
Unger's theory of community keeps his existentialism
from becoming too individualistic. It introduces need and ec-
onomic equality as conditions for, and consequences of, com-
munity in a way that has much in common with the bishops'
theory of solidaristic equality. 42 For both Unger and the bish-
ops, community is both an instrumental and a substantive
norm. It is instrumental because it is necessary for the protec-
tion and realization of human dignity and human transcen-
dence. It is substantive in that humans are fundamentally so-
cial beings, and therefore, require community as an
independent good.
Unger defines community as "the situation in which so-
cial relations are based on shared purposes whose moral au-
thority is recognized and in which men view and treat one
another as concrete and complete beings, that is, as
individuals."
43
This definition of community requires Unger, like the
39. Id. at 598-600.
40. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 267-74.
41. Id. at 242-48.
42. According to some critics, Unger's emphasis on transformation
and revision as a solution to the problem of relating individuality and soci-
ality "seems to smother and suffocate individuality ... , [and] frustrate the
search for togetherness and community . . . . Unger's obsession with
change has caused him to overlook the necessity for constancy." Hutchin-
son & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1533.
43. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 184. Unger compares his commu-
nity of shared purpose to Aristotle's philia, Aquinas' charity, Hume's sym-
pathy, and Comte's and Durkheim's altruism. Id. at 220. He defines the
related concept of solidarity as, "our feeling of responsibility for those
whose lives touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser
willingness to share their fate." LAW, supra note 11, at 205.
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bishops, to grant moral authority to human nature.4 But, un-
like the bishops, Unger does not accept the existence of intel-
ligible essences, or objective value in the traditional sense.
Rather, he seeks a synthesis of the suprahistorical and the his-
toricist, the relational and the essentialist, and the universal
and the personalist notions of human nature.'5 Unger as-
sumes that the relative absence of domination in society al-
lows one to give moral weight to a consensus over time and
between cultures in order to determine the content of the
universal in human nature."6 In effect, Unger claims that
"authentic" human nature, which equals the good, is
whatever exists free of domination, the existence of which is
known by moral intuition.47 Since freedom from domination
44. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 196, 221, 227.
45. Id. at 193-95.
46. Id. at 221. Unger, in relying on moral consensus in a situation
free of domination, has been likened to "ideal-choice" theorists, like Rawls,
who claim that choices gain moral authority to the extent that distorting
influences are eliminated. But this likeness ends to the extent that Unger
does not seek "an Archimedean point outside history . . . but assign[s]
weight to the values chosen by those individuals who actually live in his-
tory." Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1497-98.
47. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 243-45. This correlation between
being and goodness has been criticized for presupposing "some normative
standard beyond any fortuitous convergence of values. Yet Unger['s] ....
theory is dedicated to demonstrating the impossibility of discovering any
such suprahistorical standard." Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at
1499. "In effect, Unger seeks to fulfill the Spinozian ambition of organiz-
ing society so as to approach 'nearer and nearer to the model of human
nature.' " Id. at 1496 (quoting B. SPINOZA, ETHICS (1952)).
Other critics argue that, by defining the good as that which exists free
from domination, he has essentially defined sin out of human nature, mak-
ing it extrinsic to the person. See Kronman, Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV.
167, 191 (1976); Leff, Memorandum (Book Review), 29 STAN. L. REV. 879,
885-86 (1977); Soper, Book Review, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1551 (1977).
Liberalism, it is claimed, succeeds precisely because it accepts and tries to
work with sin in human nature (e.g., self-interest will promote the common
good), or it takes the contradictions, such as that between the self and
others, and tries to balance them. Unger's attempts to resolve these contra-
dictions and approximate an ideal of wholeness "must threaten the individ-
ual and alienate man from himself." Harries, The Contradictions of Liberal
Thought (Book Review), 85 YALE L.J. 847, 854 (1976). Others claim that he
has replaced the supernatural with an idealized humanity. Johnson, Do You
Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 287 n.104 (1984).
These criticisms overstate the case. Certainly, Unger recognizes the per-
son's inherent incompleteness in both conduct and understanding. But, like
Aquinas, this incompleteness is not for Unger properly called sin, in the
sense of a defect in human nature. Rather, -[i]t is the character of the
world and of man's place within it." It is finite human nature, not its sinful-
ness, per se, that is at work here. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 291. There-
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requires equal participation in community, and equal partici-
pation requires economic distribution based primarily on
need, Unger, like the bishops, ties his theory of community
to equality (albeit a more absolute equality), but he adds an
epistemological dimension that is not emphasized by the bish-
ops' more objective theory of human nature.
3. Fundamental Theories: Possibilities for Convergence
The bishops and Unger share similar fundamental theo-
ries that underlie their principles of distributive justice. The
bishops' theories of human dignity and solidaristic equality
correspond to Unger's theories of human transcendence and
community of purpose. But Unger's skepticism leads him to
treat these in more instrumental terms than the bishops. To a
certain extent, the ability to smash and to transcend all con-
texts becomes a defining quality of human nature. As will be
discussed, Unger's theory of community is more like that of
the bishops in its concern for interdependence, its relation-
ship to the development of the virtues, and its relationship to
human rights. Unger, however, ties community much more
closely to economic equality.
This focus on equality is evident in Unger's stronger
stress on equal participation in all areas of social life. It is also
evident in his discussion of distributive justice. The bishops
and Unger share two basic starting points for their discussion
of distributive justice: 1) the social nature of material goods,
and 2) the norm of solidarity, or sympathy, as the basis for
evaluating distributive inequality. As we will see, they differ,
however, in the extent that they take these concepts to their
fore, Unger's theory of human nature may be compatible with a Thomist
concept of grace as elevating finite human nature. He posits an end of
human existence-the ultimate harmony of being and goodness-that ab-
solutely transcends human nature; it is properly a supernatural end. Grace
elevates finite human nature to a supernatural end. See generally R. HAIGHT,
THE EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE OF GRACE (1979).
It is not clear, however, to what extent he would consider grace as heal-
ing fallen human nature. To the extent he does not admit to fallen human
nature, but locates sin entirely outside of the person, Unger diverges con-
siderably from Aquinas. Even to the extent that Unger recognizes evil, in
the sense of philistinism or indifference to developing human potential -
both individually and as a species, Unger is far more Pelagian than even
Aquinas. He is Pelagian in the sense that he claims that speculative
thought, combined with praxis, without more, can overcome philistinism.
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 28. This attack on philistinism characterizes
the Frankfurt School, from which Unger draws. Johnson, supra, at 250
n.8.
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logical conclusions. The bishops seem more willing to toler-
ate inequalities in wealth and power so long as the basic ne-
cessities of all are met. Unger's model of distributive justice
has a much stricter egalitarian ideal that approaches absolute
equality as a norm.
The bishops and Unger's fundamental theories are bet-
ter understood in terms of their discussion of basic economic
rights. Of particular importance are the right to basic neces-
sities, human perfection, and the relationship between equal-
ity and community.
B. The Right to Basic Necessities
1. The Bishops
The bishops' emphasis on the various human rights and
duties that represent the "minimum conditions for life in
community" suggests the priority of basic human rights.48
These minimum conditions include the right to basic necessi-
ties and the duty to help build social structures that will guar-
antee these basic necessities and other human rights for all
persons in society.49 The basic necessities have been outlined
in some detail in the social encyclicals. They include food,
clothing, shelter, rest and medical care. 50
It is important to note that these basic necessities are
part of the "minimum conditions" for life in community;
they are "rights inhering in the nature of human persons.""
They are not, as Michael Novak asserts, merely "goods indis-
pensable to a full human life."' 52 As minimum conditions they
48. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 83.
49. It is significant that the bishops discuss rights and duties in
terms of "norms," whereas the Lay Letter focuses on "virtues." While the
ethics of virtue is important-the bishops discuss this in the final section
and throughout the letter-the preponderance of the use of "norm" in the
bishops' ethical analysis, as opposed to "virtue," has important implications
for moral agency, as well as for the general appeal of the pastoral letter.
On balance, the Lay Letter has a far greater emphasis on the virtue of
individual moral agents, particularly the entrepreneur and those who give
to charity. Lay Letter, supra note 23, at 9-11. The bishops, on the other
hand, place greater emphasis on structures and policies that will provide
basic necessities and protect other rights of the poor. The Lay Letter tends
to focus on the virtue of assisting the poor (as well as the self-interest!),
whereas the pastoral letter tends to focus on the right of the poor to de-
mand distributive justice.
50. See supra note 6.
51. Hollenbach, The Growing End of an Argument, AMERICA, Nov. 30,
1985, at 363, 365.
52. Id. (quoting Novak, Economic Rights: The Servile State, CATHOLI-
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may relate to the state's obligation to protect the public or-
der, and not merely to the more general obligation of all so-
cial actors to promote the "full human life" that character-
izes the common good.
The importance of basic necessities for life in community
is evident in two of the bishops' three "priority principles."
The first priority principle states that "[t]he fulfillment of the
basic needs of the poor is of the highest priority;" the third
states that "[t]he investment of wealth, talent and human en-
ergy should be specially directed to benefit those who are
poor or economically insecure."53 These admittedly indeter-
minate priority principles are important because they avoid
evaluating the economy solely or even principally according
to aggregate productivity, efficiency, or profits. Instead, these
factors are considered in conjunction with the economy's
ability to meet the basic needs of the poor, which is given
priority, as a matter of distributive justice.
5 4
It is important to note here that the bishops do not share
liberalism's reticence about defining basic necessities with
some degree of specificity. In refusing to place aggregate pro-
ductivity and economic efficiency on a moral pedestal, the
bishops are rejecting the moral skepticism of classical eco-
CISM IN CRISIS, Oct. 1985, at 10 (emphasis added)).
53. Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 92, 94.
54. The priority of basic necessities can be understood in light of
the difference between liberalism's consequentialist and utilitarian ethic
and the bishops' mixed deontological-consequentialist, but not utilitarian,
ethic. On the one hand, the bishops' deontological ethic does not sacrifice
the right to dignified work, basic necessities, a just wage, or certain individ-
ual liberties to the ends of economic growth or efficiency. On the other
hand, the right to private property and the tolerance of inequality are justi-
fied only to the extent that they result in the desired consequences of pro-
moting the human development of all and ensuring that basic rights and
necessities are met. To the extent that the bishops' social ethic is conse-
quentalist, prudential moral judgments, based on nonmoral social, scien-
tific, economic, and political data ("the signs of the times"), gain added
significance. See, e.g., id. paras. 132-33.
Consequentialism, however, does not mean utilitarianism for the bishops.
They generally do not support the individual or collective balancing of
good over evil-precisely because the common good does not consist
merely of the sum of individual interests and goods. Rather, they prioritize
values when they are in conflict-e.g., the right to basic necessities takes
priority over any absolute right to private property. Subsidiarity, participa-
tion, and the right to private property are instrumental values that are
designed to protect human dignity and promote community. See D. HOL-
LENBACH, supra note 18, at 98, Fig. 1 (distinguishing between personal, so-
cial, and instrumental rights). For a comparison of deontological and teleo-
logical theories of ethics, see W. FRANKENNA, supra note 23, at 14-17.
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nomics, a skepticism that denies the ability to distinguish be-
tween superfluous desires and basic needs.55 Although the
natural law doctrine has been significantly reinterpreted since
World War II,56 Catholic thought still begins with the pre-
mise that objective truth is accessible to all people by reason
of their common humanity. Reasonable persons, in dialogue
with others of good will, can define the individual and the
common good with some degree of certainty. Consequently,
in contrast to the liberal skeptics, the bishops presume to
make moral judgments as they distinguish needs from wants,
as they set priorities in economic policy, and as they discuss
economic inequality."
Another distinctive feature of the bishops' principle of
the priority of basic needs is its relationship to property
rights. The bishops reject notions of private property rights
that are, for all practical purposes, absolutist and individualis-
tic. 58 Private property is an important instrumental, not sub-
stantive, value in Catholic social teaching. Its importance as
an instrumental value arises from the empirical judgment
that private property rights are an essential means to protect
personal liberty, fulfill basic human needs, and promote full
55. In classical economics there is no way to value the marginal util-
ity of the yuppie's extra scoop of Haagen-daz and the marginal utility of
the starving Ethiopian's scoop of grain. The Lay Letter adopts this moral
skepticism insofar as it gives basic value to the "rational" market, which it
claims is "a kind of calculus of intelligent choices." Lay Letter, supra note
23, at 45. This "intelligent choice" should not be confused with a rational
discernment of truth or good. Here reason is merely used to design a strat-
egy to maximize individual needs and desires.
56. The reinterpretation of natural law has involved three develop-
ments. First, there has been a greater appreciation for historicity and plu-
ralism, resulting in a more inductive methodology (i.e., reading the "signs
of the times"). See, e.g., C. CURRAN, THEMES IN FUNDAMENTAL MORAL THE-
OLOGY 99-100 (1977); D. HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 114-33. Second,
there has been a greater stress on the importance of individual freedom
and particularity in addition to that of universal human nature. See, e.g., J.
GUSTAFSON, supra note 33, at 93. Third, there has been a greater reliance
on scripture and other distinctively Christian sources to clarify and justify
the demands and priorities of philosophical notions of justice and the good.
See, e.g., D. HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 130-33.
57. Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 79, 91-96, 183. The bishops
reject what the skeptic must affirm: "that a free market automatically pro-
duces justice." Id. para. 113.
58. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 32-33, 169-72 (1974) (presenting a




human development.8 9 Therefore, the right to private prop-
erty cannot be defined in absolutist or individualistic terms
precisely because it is so important a right; rather, its impor-
tance demands that "ownership should be possible for a
broad sector of our population."' In recognizing the great
value of property, the bishops nevertheless assert that neces-
sities may take priority over property rights. According to
the bishops: "There is a 'social mortgage' on private prop-
erty. 'Private property does not constitute for anyone an ab-
solute or unconditioned right. No one is justified in keeping
for his exclusive use what he does not need, when others lack
necessities.' "e This ethical precept has important legal im-
plications: It justifies even socialization or expropriation of
property in certain circumstances.
62
2. Unger
Like the bishops, Unger insists that human transcen-
dence requires that the minimum conditions of community
life be met. Therefore, he proposes limited rights designed to
guarantee that all individuals are able to counter developing
hierarchies and thereby develop their full human potential.6 "
Included in this spectrum of limited rights is the right to ba-
sic necessities.
In contrast to the bishops, Unger grounds the moral and
legal right to basic necessities not only in essential human
dignity, but also in a theory of distributive justice based pri-
59. D. HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 55. Cf C. B. MACPHERSON,
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 139 (1973) (arguing for an ex-
panded notion of property rights as not merely "rights in material things
and revenues," but "a right to a share in political power as instrumental in
determining the kind of society, [and] a right to that kind of society which
is instrumental to a full and free life"). Compare the discussion of "integral
development," infra notes 76 to 81 and accompanying text.
60. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 112.
61. Id. para. 113 (quoting Paul VI, On the Development of Peoples
(Populorum Progressio) no. 23 (1967). Cf V. HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS: JUSTI-
FYING SOCIAL ACTION 189 ("[T]o the extent that property rights are moral
rights, they extend only to the satisfaction of needs and of the require-
ments for adequate self-development. Above that level, property 'rights'
should be seen not as moral rights but as legal fictions resulting from a
political decision.").
62. "The determination of when such conditions exist must be
made on a case by case basis in light of the demands of the common good."
Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 113. See generally D. DORR, THE OPTION
FOR THE POOR 95 (1984).
63. CLS, supra note 11, at 599-600.
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marily on need. Unger adopts the Marxist notion that human
needs reveal both concrete individuality and a common hu-
manity. But he also recognizes an epistemological problem in
that society lacks self-evident standards which might deter-
mine a hierarchy of needs."' Furthermore, Unger acknowl-
edges the practical need for capital accumulation to achieve
other ends. This analysis leads Unger to concede that society
may benefit from a temporary, mixed standard of distribu-
tion based on need and merit.6 5 Thus, very much like the
bishops, the "most tangible and most widely recognized"
needs-i.e., basic necessities-would be treated as "absolute
entitlements.""6 Beyond this, a standard of merit would oper-
ate. Unlike the bishops, Unger considers distribution based
solely on need as the ideal. But ultimately, he parallels the
bishops in calling for need as a first principle only insofar as
basic necessities remain unmet.
Interestingly, Unger includes the right to basic necessi-
ties in his "immunity" and "market" rights. For Unger as for
the bishops, these rights reflect a desire to develop economic
rights in the United States to match already established polit-
64. The bishops are much more confident in making fairly specific
moral judgments about basic human needs and the meaning of justice. Due
to his soft skepticism, Unger is confident only that sustained critique can
determine which moral intuitions, shared values and human experiences
might indicate authentic human nature.
65. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 270-72. According to Unger,
merit is arbitrary because it is so heavily based on differences in arbitrary
natural talents, with the result that:
The lucky ones can then cash in on the favors of nature like pros-
titutes whose price depends on whether they are fat or slim. The
exercise of power by the higher talents over the less gifted be-
comes simply another form of personal domination unless a moral
standard can be found to justify and limit it.
Id. at 172-73. But Unger goes further: "The mere possession of skills can
never in itself justify material advantages or the exercise of power." Id. at
273. Nevertheless Unger admits that diversities between individuals will al-
ways lead to inequalities in leadership and moral authority, even if all other
distribution of wealth and power is based on need. PASSION, supra note 11,
at 215-19.
Nozick and Rawls agree that natural abilities may be morally arbitrary,
but this assumption does not lead them to Unger's conclusion that these
criteria should not be considered as legitimate distributive mechanisms.
Rawls creates a presumption that material goods are common property, but
tolerates inequalities resulting from meritocratic systems of distribution.
Nozick asserts that individuals are entitled to assets they naturally possess.
See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1526.
66. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 272; CLS, supra note 11, at 599.
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ical and civil rights."' In contrast to the bishops, Unger views
the right to basic necessities as not only a substantive or posi-
tive right based in human dignity but also as an instrumental
or negative right designed to protect the individual from
domination by and dependence on others. Contrary to con-
servative assertions, Unger claims that welfare entitlements
are actually necessary to protect individual political and civil
liberties, and do not pose a threat of domination or depen-
dence, either legal or extra-legal.6 8
Unger does not fear the dependence usually associated
with welfare entitlements because, in his system, basic needs
would be met within the smaller institutions in society, the
organic groups.69 Finally, Unger's concern with decentraliza-
tion-an issue examined later in this article-leads him to
discuss basic necessities not only in terms of rights protected
by the government, but also in terms of a distributive princi-
ple which operates within his organic groups. He moves away
from the welfare state and socialist efforts that attempt to
create national entitlements to basic necessities. The bishops
also expect decentralized, non-governmental organizations to
play an important role in providing basic necessities, but they
do not propose such a comprehensive communitarian model
as Unger advocates with his organic groups.
Unger shares the bishops' fundamental principle that
property rights, from both a moral and legal standpoint, are
not to be viewed from an individualistic or absolutist perspec-
tive, but rather must be evaluated in terms of the extent of
their distribution and their promotion of the common good.
But Unger's property rights are considerably more qualified
67. Like other critical legal scholars, Unger has important reserva-
tions about a rights-based system. In many respects, Unger reflects the two
strands of the CLS critique of the liberal theory of rights. The first and
perhaps most pervasive claims that rights are indeterminate. Liberalism of-
fers no objective or neutral way to choose between conflicting rights.
Therefore, any choices made in liberal legal argument are inherently polit-
ical in nature. The second claims that the liberal focus on inalienable indi-
vidual rights "reinforces the separateness and egoistic in man at the ex-
pense of the social nature of man." Thus, individuals come to see in others
the limitation rather than the realization of their own freedom. Further-
more, "rights-consciousness" legitimates existing patterns of social hierar-
chies by creating an "illusion of naturalness and objectivity." While this
latter critique is derived from Marx, it differs from Marx by not identifying
community as the permanent source of value. Hutchinson & Monahan,
supra note 12, at 1486-88.
68. CLS, supra note 11, at 597, 655.
69. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 272.
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than those of the bishops, they are more closely related to
domination, and they lack an explicit understanding of the
bishops' notion of stewardship.
While Unger considers welfare entitlements on a par
with political and civil liberties in that they protect individual
and political freedom, he contends that property rights have
actually undermined liberty. He rejects the Lockean or
Nozickean strict correlation between freedom and inviolable
property rights.7" He claims that absolute property rights re-
duce some individuals to direct dependence on others. First,
they impose a large-scale threat to democracy and freedom
"by allowing relatively small groups, in control of investment
decisions, to have a decisive say over the conditions of collec-
tive prosperity or impoverishment. ' 71 Second, they support
an extra-legal system of social organization that conflicts with
the property ideal, for example, by failing to establish univer-
sal property ownership. Third, absolute property rights re-
strain economic development by limiting invention and real
competition. Huge disparities of scale, influence, and advan-
tage mean that economic decentralization, or what Unger
calls "empowered democracy," cannot be achieved by essen-
tially absolute property rights. 2
To avoid these problems, Unger does not eliminate
property rights but, like the bishops, seeks to ensure that
these rights are more widely distributed and exercised. He
plans to realize this wider distribution of property rights in a
more specific-and more radical-manner than the bishops
envision. He proposes the establishment of a "rotating capital
fund." This fund, administered by government agencies,
70. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1525-26. Like
Nozick's unsupported claim of the inviolability of private property rights,
Unger's redistributive scheme is based on an equally controversial and con-
tingent assumption that property is a priori held in common. Id.
71. CLS, supra note 11, at 594.
72. Multinationals are examples of "huge disparities of scale"; by
"influence" Unger means political and economic; by "advantage" he
means inheritance and related rights. Id. at 594-96. According to Unger,
the liberal notion of absolute property rights fails: first, because it is a polit-
ical manifestation of personal relations based in jealousy; and second, be-
cause it adopts an objectivism that falsely assumes that the market system
requires the absolute property right. PASSION, supra note 11, at 211; CLS,
supra note 11, at 570, 656. Hutchinson and Monahan suggest that Unger's
economic analysis draws on Charles Lindblom who, like Unger, believes
that greater flexibility and diversity in policymaking is desirable. Hutchin-
son & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1523 n.217 (referring to C. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977)).
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would consist of loans to groups of workers and technicians
that would seek to encourage a constant flow of new entrants
into the market.7 The legal counterpart to this capital fund
would be the "disaggregation of the consolidated property
right" into what Unger calls "market rights." '74 The political
process would determine the extent and method of redistri-
bution through this rotating capital fund. But whatever the
amount of "disaggregation" determined by this process, mar-
ket rights would remain a "subcategory of right," not an ab-
solute right from which other rights are derived .7 The mar-
ket rights, in the context of the rotating capital fund, are
meant to do what the absolute property right is supposed to
do: allow individual development free of domination. These
market rights do this by guaranteeing access to capital for
those without and thereby promoting decentralization.
3. The Right to Basic Necessities: Possibilities for
Convergence
Both the bishops and Unger stress that human dignity
requires that society protect economic rights, especially the
right to basic necessities, to the same extent that it protects
political and civil rights. They differ, however, in that Un-
ger's skepticism is less confident in defining and prioritizing
basic needs. Despite his epistemological humility, Unger goes
beyond the bishops in adopting a quasi-Marxist ideal of distri-
bution based on need, both as a means of establishing con-
crete and universal human nature and, more importantly, as
a protection against domination. The bishops follow a more
deductive approach in defining concrete human needs and do
not judge their importance in terms of domination.
While the bishops emphasize the qualified nature of
property rights, Unger more intensely focuses on this quali-
fied aspect of the rights. In stressing this qualified nature,
Unger appears to envision a much more fluid-or, as he says,
"plastic"--economy than the bishops. Unger is willing to
leave the definition of these rights entirely to the vagaries of
the political process. The bishops, however, believe that basic
rights can be secured more within the context of a reformed
but stable economy. Furthermore, Unger is more willing to
conclude that aggregation of property automatically leads to
73. CLS, supra note 11, at 596.
74. Id. at 595-96.
75. Id. at 600.
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domination. He does not recognize the notion of stewardship
that allows the bishops to tolerate unequal control over sig-
nificant resources in the belief that those in control can and
will exercise their control in a responsible way. Unger does
not appear to espouse such a notion of social responsibility in
the use of property. Despite these differences, the bishops
and Unger share the critical notion that property rights are
not absolute, but are meaningful only to the extent that
property is universally distributed.
C. Basic Necessities and Human Perfection
1. The Bishops
The primary importance of the right to basic necessities
and the qualified property right may be understood only in
the context of what Paul VI called "integral development." '
The principle of integral development, or human perfection,
differentiates Catholic notions of distributive justice from
those based on a materialistic conception of human nature.
7
According to this principle, the common good encompasses
more than the economic development of people; it also in-
cludes the full development of the human person, both in its
material and spiritual dimensions. Therefore, the right to ba-
sic economic necessities is not more fundamental than civil,
political, or religious liberties-all are equally fundamental.
7 8
While integral development has many components, it is
important to this discussion because it adds an element to the
theory of distributive justice: participation in community.79
The bishops consider a minimum level of participation
through the family, voluntary organizations, and economic,
social, and political institutions to be a matter of justice. This
means that the economy or political system not only must
76. Christiansen, supra note 25, at 669 (citing Paul VI, On the Devel-
opment of Peoples (Populorum Progressio) nos. 14, 16 (1967)).
77. John Paul II argues that materialistic conceptions of human na-
ture derive from the "fundamental error of thought . . . called an error of
materialism . . . [or] economism." The error lies in the fact that material-
ism "directly or indirectly includes a conviction of the primacy and superi-
ority of the material, and directly or indirectly places the spiritual and the
personal (man's activity, moral values and such matters) in a position of
subordination to material reality." John Paul II, On Human Work (Laborem
Exercens) no. 13 (1981). It is important to note that John Paul II includes
under "materialism" or "economism" both Marxism's dialectical material-
ism and "primitive capitalism and liberalism." Id.
78. Hollenbach, supra note 51, at 363-65.
79. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 81.
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meet the basic necessities of individuals, but must also allow
individuals to be active and productive members of society.
The belief that participation is essential for human develop-
ment partially explains the bishops' advocacy of experiments
in economic democracy.80
Participation is both a substantive and an instrumental
norm: substantive because it is part of the development and
expression of an individual's talents and abilities; instrumen-
tal because it is a condition of community, and it is a means
by which basic necessities and other substantive human rights
are guaranteed. 8' In other words, full human development
requires community, community requires minimal levels of
participation, and participation requires the protection
of-and is necessary to protect-certain rights, such as the
right to basic necessities.
While there is a positive correlation between participa-
tion and the protection of the right to basic necessities, there
is a negative correlation between the second aspect of inte-
gral development and material concerns. This second compo-
nent suggests that individuals are complex spiritual beings
whose proper ends conflict with a materialistic ethos of mod-
ern society. This Christian critique of the materialistic ethos
is a critique of idolatry; it is a claim of Christian anthropology
that mere existence does not precede being, that security is
found only in God. It is also a critique of blindness, of
wealth's destructive power over love and of its callousness to
the needs of the neighbor, especially the poor.8" In sum, a
consumer society that creates and feeds superfluous wants but
that fails to meet the basic needs of some has become a "slave
of the objects which [it] makes.
'83
The rejection of materialism has a double significance
for social and distributive justice as it is expressed in the op-
tion for the poor. First, those who reject materialism, who
80. Id. para. 197.
81. Morality, supra note 20, at 32.
82. Id. at 16; J. BENESTAD, supra note 9, at 123-25. Paul VI called
greed, "[tjhe most evident form of moral underdevelopment." Second
Draft, supra note 1, para. 79 (quoting On the Development of Peoples
(Populorum Progressio) no. 19 (1967)). See also id. paras. 55-60. What is mor-
ally objectionable is not the enjoyment of material well-being, which is part
of natural happiness, or the attainment of basic economic security, which is
a natural right. It is the "ceaseless striving after material advantage which,
as Hobbes said, 'ceaseth only with death.' " Christiansen, supra note 20, at
16.
83. Paul VI, A Call to Action (Octogesima Adveniens) no. 9 (1971).
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enter into solidarity with the poor, and who promote justice
"experience the power and presence of Christ." '84 Second,
one can ascertain and meet the needs of the poor only by
rejecting materialism.
Therefore, the concept of integral development signifi-
cantly qualifies any concern with individual productivity or
with the mere meeting of basic needs. An increased GNP,
increased equality, and the provision of basic necessities do
not alone produce the common good. The common good is
defined in terms of levels and quality of employment, the
amount of cooperation and community, and the significance
of spiritual values in a society.
2. Unger
To some extent, the bishops' ideal of integral develop-
ment has some parallels in Unger's social theory. Unger de-
fines freedom in terms of the development of the virtues, and
he insists that such virtues as faith, hope, and love can flour-
ish better under certain institutional arrangements. 85 He does
not emphasize economic development in describing the good
society-not because he does not think it is critically neces-
sary, but because, as in Catholic social teaching, it is not suffi-
cient for human development or the promotion of the com-
mon good. Unger is more concerned with the impact of the
social order on the development of the virtues and the reduc-
tion of the psychological instabilities or antinomies exper-
ienced by modern humanity, especially as these relate to in-
terpersonal relations.86 In that sense, Unger's theory of
distributive justice has a heavily spiritual dimension.
The important role of participation in the development
of the individual and species aspects of human nature relates
to this spiritual dimension. According to Unger, limitations
on participation limit human transcendence. Even moreso
84. First Draft, supra note 16, para. 62.
85. PASSION, supra note 11, at 247-50. For example, he recognizes
that the "higher standard" (virtue) of solidarity (community)-i.e., the vol-
untary denunciation of rights and the granting of primacy to the interests
of the other party-must be exceptional, and should not be incorporated
into contract law, because it departs from standard practices and senti-
ments. On the other hand, he does not accept the notion of liberty of con-
tract as pure arms-length bargaining. The "counter-principle" of solidarity
can inform contract law by requiring that the interests of the other party
be taken into account, at least to a significant, though not predominant,
degree. CLS, supra note 11, at 641-42.
86. CLS, supra note 11, at 586.
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than the bishops, Unger adopts a model of society based on
participatory democracy, or what he calls "empowered
democracy. "87
"Empowered democracy," or "democracy of ends,"
would "remake social and [economic] life in the image of lib-
eral politics." ' In other words, Unger wants to extend the
liberal political and civil ideals of equality of participation,
freedom from dependence, and a positivistic view of the state
to all areas of society and the economy. Contending that
"everything can be brought into the arena of public dis-
course," Unger wants to abolish traditional distinctions be-
tween public and' private and between politics and
economics.8 9
The synthesis of these traditionally autonomous realms
applies at two levels. In the organic group, it means that effi-
ciency considerations or other economic criteria should
neither determine the division of labor, power, and material
resources, nor should they establish the community's ends.
These decisions should be subject to democratic determina-
tion. Unger calls this democratic determination within the or-
ganic group the "democracy of ends." The democracy of
ends is more radical and comprehensive than the bishops' call
for greater worker participation in industry and for more ex-
periments in cooperative enterprises.
Beyond the organic groups, Unger also sees
macroeconomic questions as being largely matters for politi-
cal decision-precisely because he considers capital to be so-
cial in nature. 90 Therefore, the political process is to deter-
mine the precise nature of market rights, for example.
Society should not establish these rights as part of objective
legal doctrines or the market. In general, just as privilege and
merit are not principles of decision in the political realm, Un-
ger seeks to eliminate them from the social and economic
realms.
87. Id. at 591-93.
88. Id. at 602.
89. Id.; KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 274.
90. Unger's system would replace "the absolute, consolidated prop-
erty right" with "market rights," i.e., "conditional and provisional claims
to divisible portions of social capital." CLS, supra note 11, at 600. Accord-
ing to Unger, "[h]ow provisional and conditional they should be, in any
given sector or in the economy as a whole, poses one of the key questions
to be answered by conscious collective decision." Id.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
3. Basic Necessities and Human Perfection: Possibilities for
Convergence
Ironically, the bishops, who certainly have the more
overtly spiritual mission, concentrate, at least in the economy
pastoral, more on economic rights than Unger, who focuses
more explicitly on the inadequacies of liberal thought and
practice and the effect on interpersonal relations. Any differ-
ence, however, derives more from the particular economic
focus of the pastoral than it does from any theoretical differ-
ence. Clearly, both the bishops and Unger consider basic eco-
nomic rights only in the larger context of full human devel-
opment in community. Both recognize that this full human
development necessitates active participation in all areas of
social life. For the bishops, this participation suggests "exper-
iments" in forms of economic democracy such as coopera-
tives, but more fundamentally, it requires an opportunity to
develop oneself and to contribute to the common good
through work and through civic and political participation.
For Unger, participation is more strictly construed. He does
not merely advocate "experiments" in economic democracy
but desires to democratize and politicize nearly all areas of
life: the political, the economic and the social. This more rad-
ical notion of participation is a consequence of Unger's closer
identification of community and knowledge of the good with
economic equality. Because the bishops do not so closely link
community and equality, participation may take more varied
forms and is not as limited to the one person, one vote model
seemingly presupposed by Unger.
While the bishops recognize that inequality of wealth in-
hibits participation in community, they emphasize the detri-
mental effect of any excessive wealth on an individual's ability
to know and to do the good. For the bishops, materialism
may taint even economic equality; for Unger, economic
equality furthers knowledge of the authentic human nature.
He has little or nothing to say about materialism per se.
D. Economic Equality and Community
1. The Bishops
A final principle of distributive justice is the developing
norm of relative equality. 91 According to Christiansen, rela-
tive equality requires that "wealth and resources ought to be
91. See Christiansen, supra note 25.
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regularly redistributed to redress the differences between
groups, sectors, and even nations" so as not to inhibit human
solidarity." Relative equality, or strong egalitarianism, is not
merely a perfectionist ideal; rather, it institutionalizes the
substantive principle of human community or solidarity. This
norm suggests that economic inequality is objectionable, not
because it violates some egalitarian principle in Catholic so-
cial teaching, but because it tends to undermine the potential
for building human community.
According to Christiansen, recent social encyclicals have
come to the empirical judgment by "reading the signs of the
times" that inequality is the major social problem of the mod-
ern world. Based on empirical evidence, these social encycli-
cals have concluded that toleration of inequalities in the be-
lief that economic growth would reduce poverty and
economic injustice has, in fact, led to greater inequalities and
aggravated injustice, creating a "crisis of solidarity." There-
fore, the encyclicals have proposed egalitarian redistribution
or relative equality as the means for redressing these inequal-
ities and injustices and promoting human community."
The bishops adopt the norm of relative equality in part.
They recognize that "[s]ome degree of inequality is not only
acceptable, but may be considered desirable for economic
and social reasons," 4 but they condition the moral accepta-
bility of unequal income on two moral principles: the priority
of basic needs and the importance of participation. The pri-
ority of basic needs establishes "a strong presumption against
extreme inequality of income and wealth as long as there are
poor, hungry and homeless people in our midst."9 5 This pre-
92. Id. at 652. Christiansen suggests that the norm of relative equal-
ity entails three functions: "(1) the (re)distribution of resources on egalita-
rian lines, (2) for the realization of full human life by all, (3) in a spirit
which reduces differences and increases the life shared in common." Id. at
666.
93. Id. at 654-55. The bishops are not calling for absolute equality
or a general leveling of condition, but seek to hold inequalities within de-
fined moral limits. Permissible differences depend on the norm of commu-
nitarian equality, which aims to sustain and enhance social bonds. Id. at
653-54. Cf Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 78, 183.
94. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 183.
95. Id. In the first draft the bishops cited favorably to Rawls' second
principle but concluded that Rawls diverges from Catholic social teaching
on several key points. First Draft, supra note 16, para. 99 n.23). See J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (1971) ("All social primary
goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
sumption can be overridden only if an absolute scarcity of re-
sources renders the fulfillment of material necessities "strictly
impossible." The bishops conclude that no such scarcity ex-
ists in the United States, and therefore, that existing inequali-
ties are "unacceptable." '96 The principle of participation sug-
gests that, "extreme inequality [is] a threat to the solidarity
of the human community, for great disparities lead to deep
social divisions and conflict."9
The bishops appear to move away from a "maximim"
distributive principle similar to that implied by John XXIII's
theory of social justice. A maximim criterion looks to socio-
economic development to promote the welfare of all, even if
it might result in increased inequality. To the extent the bish-
ops adopt the norm of relative equality, they move closer to
the "least difference" principle. This principle demands poli-
cies that reduce significant inequalities between the rich and
the poor, even if the basic necessities of the poor are met by
an increase in aggregate wealth. The bishops are concerned,
not Only with the injustice of some going without necessities
while others hold considerable wealth, but also with the detri-
mental effect of inequality on the development of community
and increased participation of all persons in that community.
2. Unger
As with the principles of need and qualified property
rights, Unger takes the notion of relative equality or strong
egalitarianism further than the bishops. Unger more closely
approaches a notion of absolute equality of material re-
sources and power. For Unger as for the bishops, this relative
equality is an instrumental norm necessary to ensure the
achievement of the substantive norms of sympathy (commu-
nity) and participation (the democracy of ends). These norms,
in turn, are necessary for the full understanding and develop-
ment of human nature.
Unger insists that a theory of human nature that accu-
rately perceives both its individual and social aspects cannot
or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored."). For a Cath-
olic critique of Rawls see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). For a critique of Sandel, see Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 895 (1985).
96. Second Draft, supra note 1, para. 76.
97. Id. para. 78. See also id. para. 183 ("large inequalities in the eco-
nomic sphere mean that the degree of power and the level of participation
in the political and social spheres is also very uneven.").
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tolerate significant inequalities of wealth or power because
such inequalities are often unjustified, and therefore, involve
domination.98 According to Unger, neither class nor merit
can serve to justify the distribution of resources or power in
the private realm, so he adopts need as a distributive princi-
ple. His system, therefore, implies relative, if not absolute,
equality. The bishops do not endorse such a conclusion be-
cause they view merit and factors other than need as morally
justifiable criteria. Unger tolerates consideration of these
other factors when practical necessity dictates, but he does
not find them morally compelling.
For Unger, the only morally acceptable foundation for
power or wealth is that which derives from authentic human
nature or human need, and such a nature can only be known
and developed through a democratic community of shared
ends freed from inequality or domination."' Relative equality
is a prerequisite for the democratic participation that defines
the shared values necessary to overcome the problem of sub-
jective value and to better understand authentic human na-
ture and its needs. Furthermore, strong egalitarianism is the
consequence of Unger's acceptance of need as the basic prin-
ciple for distribution.
Unger also considers equality in community in terms of
the role of the passions in interpersonal relations. Not only
can inequality corrupt community and collaboration, as dis-
cussed above, it also obscures the distinction between mere
envy of others and justified indignation at inequality. By re-
ducing inequality and the attendant indignation, the exis-
tence of envy becomes readily apparent. While envy cannot
be entirely eliminated, it must be diminished because it pre-
vents one from treating others as concrete and unique indi-
viduals; it limits the possibility of transformed personal rela-
tions based on mutual acceptance of diversity and love.100
The bishops also recognize that inequality of wealth affects
the virtues, but they focus less on the problem of envy and
more on the blindness to the needs of others that corre-
sponds with excessive materialism. Finally, as mentioned ear-
lier in the discussion of immunity and market rights, because
Unger correlates the accumulation of property with domina-
tion, his theories demand that society reduce inequality in or-
98. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 271; PASSION, supra note 11, at
210-11.
99. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 267-72.
100. PASSION, supra note 11, at 212-16.
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der to empower individuals and in order to encourage initia-
tive and experimentation.
3. Economic Equality and Community: Possibilities for
Convergence
As discussed earlier, Unger's model of distributive justice
incorporates a fairly strict egalitarian ideal that approaches
absolute economic equality as a norm. The bishops, on the
other hand, tolerate significant inequalities of wealth so long
as society meets basic necessities and guarantees minimal
levels of economic participation.
This difference in the degree of economic equality re-
quired corresponds to a difference in the extent that the bish-
ops and Unger correlate inequality and domination. Unger
more closely links the two and more strongly asserts that po-
litical and economic equality are conditions for the fuller un-
derstanding and development of authentic human nature and
community. Both the bishops' and Unger's theories are based
in human sociality; they differ significantly, however, in the
more concrete implications of this sociality.
To the extent that Unger does not establish a strict
norm of equality, he, like the bishops, relies on prudential
judgment to determine the proper limits of inequality. The
bishops' judgment is grounded primarily in their empirical
analysis of the relationship of inequality to unmet basic
needs, and only secondarily in the negative effect of inequal-
ity on participation in community. Unger, on the other hand,
treats these more equally. Therefore, he tends more towards
a least difference principle while the bishops maintain some
aspects of a maximim principle of distribution.
II. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
A. The Bishops
The principle of subsidiarity and the theory of govern-
ment provide the political and social theory, the institutional
arrangements, which are necessary to achieve distributive jus-
tice. In conjunction with the distributive principles discussed
above, they provide means of ordering conflicting rights and
duties associated with providing the minimum conditions of
human dignity and community.
1. The Principle of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity derives from the fundamen-
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tal right and duty to participate in the common good and
from the traditional Catholic distinction between state and
society.10' The latter distinction recognizes that the state is
only one actor within a larger society, or body politic, which
is made up of diverse communities and associations, each pos-
sessing varying degrees of authority. The state is responsible
for the public order: justice, public peace, public morality,
and public prosperity. The body politic, as a whole, is respon-
sible for the broader common good, or human flourishing in
all of its material and spiritual dimensions."'
The principle of subsidiarity has three components that
take into account these distinctions. First, individuals and
groups must have a degree of autonomy in order to carry out
their roles in promoting the common good. Second, larger
communities, such as the government, must respect this au-
tonomy but also must take positive action to aid these individuals
and groups in fulfilling their roles. Third, the government and
other large organizations are not only allowed, but are re-
quired, to assume responsibilities for promoting the common
good that lower levels of organization cannot manage. 0 3
Subsidiarity assumes a pluralistic model of society that
places considerable importance on the family, voluntary as-
sociations, and other mediating institutions. It is essential to
the fulfillment of human dignity that society support and pro-
tect these associations, in part because they allow for fuller
participation by individuals in the life of the community. Sup-
port for these intermediate structures also arises from a rec-
ognition of the deleterious effects of aggregation of power in
large organizations: concentrated power corrupts and aggra-
vates oppression and injustice.' 04
The bishops recognize the importance of mediating insti-
tutions in their lengthy section entitled, "Working for
Greater Justice: Persons and Institutions. "' 0' Clearly, the
bishops expect these institutions to play a key role in meeting
101. J. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 224-28 (1982).
102. Hollenbach, supra note 51, at 364.
103. The classic statement of this principle is found in Pius XI, On
the Reconstruction of the Social Order, (Quadragesimo Anno) no. 79 (1931). See
J. BENESTAD, supra note 9, at 97 & n.8.
104. Drawing on Catholic principles, E. F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS
BEAUTIFUL (1973) develops this point and also argues that decentralization
promotes efficiency and participation. For a theological development of
this insight from a Protestant perspective, see R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND
IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932).
105. Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 97-122.
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basic necessities through voluntarism, the creation of jobs,
and the provision of basic services, as well as through just in-
stitutional practices.
It is important to note, however, that the principle of
subsidiarity applies not only to government but also to these
intermediate associations and institutions.106 Therefore, the
public-private distinction does not shield economic and other
private institutions from the operation of the principle. On
the other hand, subsidiarity is a presumptive, not an ontologi-
cal, norm.1 07 As a presumptive norm it does not object per se
to all concentrations of power, but only to the unnecessary, ar-
rogation of power. If mediating institutions in the body poli-
tic cannot solve problems of distributive justice, the principle
of subsidiarity alone does not prohibit intervention by larger
organizations, including the state. Therefore, Catholic social
teaching reserves a positive role for government in promot-
ing distributive justice in particular, and the common good,
in general.
2. The Limits of Government
This positive role of government conflicts with a mini-
malist or negative view of the role of government. It is
closely associated with the bishops' rejection of a strict public-
private distinction in political and legal theory.
In Catholic social teaching, individuals are fully social
only as political beings.10 8 According to the bishops, the gov-
ernment's primary role is "the coordination and regulation
of the activities of diverse groups in society in a way that
leads to the common good and the protection of basic
rights."'0 9 Far from being a necessary evil that should be lim-
106. The first draft was criticized for applying this principle only to
the state: "lIt isi mute on the centralization of monopoly power in Ameri-
can industry . . . . [The bishops] do not seem to comprehend that their
own social theory should compel them to question the humanity and the
efficiency of all large corporate bureaucracies: governmental, educational,
industrial, professional (including unions), military and even ecclesiastical."
Greeley, supra note 8, at 22-23. See also Greeley, What is Subsidiarity? A
Voice from Sleepy Hollow, AMERICA, Nov. 9, 1985, at 292.
107. J. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 227 (1982).
108. "As a social being, man builds his destiny within a series of par-
ticular groupings which demand, as their completion and as a necessary
condition for their development, a vaster society, one of universal charac-
ter, the political society." Paul VI, A Call to Action (Octogesima Adveniens) no.
24 (1971).
109. First Draft, supra note 16, para. 124; D. HOLLENBACH, supra note
18, at 159 (the state has primacy over economics).
[Vol. 2
CRITICAL LEGAL BISHOPS
ited at all costs, the government has a "moral function: pro-
tecting human rights and securing basic justice for all mem-
bers of the commonwealth."110 Since, as discussed earlier,
basic necessities are not merely part of human flourishing,
but are fundamental human rights whose protection is part
of the state's duty to maintain the public order, the state,
consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, may play quite an
active role. It should not only coordinate and promote pri-
vate initiatives to protect basic necessities and ensure distribu-
tive justice, but, in the last resort, it should intervene itself.
As the bishops state throughout their letter, distributive jus-
tice is not a goal to be achieved only if it is possible to do so
through the family, through private enterprise, or through
the various voluntary associations. It is something to be
achieved, if not by these lower social bodies, then by the gov-
ernment.11' While the bishops recognize that government in-
tervention poses dangers to individual freedom, they also rec-
ognize that greater social interdependence and government




Unger shares the bishops' basic assumptions about the
importance of decentralization and the affirmative role of
government in promoting the common good, in general, and
distributive justice, in particular. But, paradoxically, he takes
both decentralization of power and the affirmative role of
government to greater extremes than the bishops. As a re-
sult, he interestingly borders on anarchism and statism at the
same time. To the extent that he pushes his theory to these
fringes, he diverges from the distributive role of government
envisioned by the bishops. His intensification and integration
of the individual and social aspects of human nature lead him
away from the bishops; he models an "expressivist synthesis"
that is institutionalized in what might be called a substantially
modified anarchism-or an expressivist democracy."'
110. Second Draft, supra note 1, paras. 119, 122.
111. Id. paras. 121-22. Since subsidiarity is a presumptive, not an
ontological, norm, it provides no principled objection to - but may actu-
ally demand-active government involvement in promoting distributive
justice.
112. First Draft, supra note 16, para. 258: On the role of govern-
ment, see generally, D. HOLLENBACH, supra note 18, at 66, 155-67.
113. NoMos XIX: ANARCHY, at xxvii-xxxii (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
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1. Empowered Democracy
Unger's decentralization or empowered democracy arises
out of his soft skepticism, his context-transcending theory of
human nature, and his linkage of inequality and domination.
Since, according to Unger, all social arrangements are con-
tingent and imperfectly reflect authentic human nature, insti-
tutional structures have to be "self-revising"; they have to
"provide constant occasions to disrupt any fixed structure of
power and coordination in social life. 1 1 4 Because inequality
of wealth and power might be considered, at least presump-
tively, to be domination, liberal notions of interest group
politics and a constitutional balance of power should be re-
placed by "a social order all of whose basic features are di-
rectly or indirectly chosen by equal citizens and rightholders
rather than imposed by irresponsible privilege or blind tradi-
tion." 5 In other words, Unger envisions intermediate as-
sociations and government to be highly malleable and contin-
ually destabilized in order to counteract what he sees as the
inevitable tendency toward bureaucratization and the aggre-
gation of privileged power. This fear of bureaucratic power
provides the rationale for Unger's distribution based on need
and relative equality, as manifested in his rotating capital
fund, welfare rights and similar provisions. For Unger, par-
ticipation is the key, and meaningful participation requires
relative equality.
In more concrete terms, Unger envisions a vastly decen-
tralized structure based on his theory of organic groups. The
model of organic groups applies principles of economic de-
mocracy and community to bureaucratic organization in the
modern welfare-corporate state. The intimate nature of these
groups, the shared values, the democracy of ends, and the
breakdown of specialized divisions of labor are meant to
overcome the problems of size and bureaucratization that
plague modern society.
To the extent that these groups are designed to inte-
grate all aspects of life in a decentralized community, they
are much more comprehensive in scope-much more com-
munitarian-than the limited-function voluntary organiza-
tions envisioned by the bishops' principle of subsidiarity. For
eds. 1978). Hutchinson and Monahan reject this idea that Unger advocates
anarchistic democracy, Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12, at 1520
n.208.
114. CLS, supra note 11, at 592.
115. Id. at 591.
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example, as discussed earlier, Unger considers these organic
groups to be the primary means of establishing a just distri-
bution of goods, both in the sense that these groups will en-
sure full participation in community and in the sense that
they will ensure that society meets individual needs.
Unger's decentralized organic groups are similar to the
bishops' voluntary organizations in that they protect individu-
als from the state and counter any tendencies toward state
control. These groups fulfill many of the functions otherwise
left to the state in welfare-state and socialist societies. To the
extent that Unger's organic groups give content to some of
these functions, they could give considerable content to the
bishops' rather indeterminate principle of subsidiarity.
2. The Limits of Government
In Unger's system, the government would have two gen-
eral responsibilities. First, it would unify the various organic
groups in a larger community of shared purpose. According
to Unger, the state is the "universal association capable of
expressing a universal humanity.""1 6 Like the liberal state, it
would maintain peace between the various organic groups
and protect individual freedoms. But it would go beyond the
liberal state and would attempt to develop a community of
shared values (as opposed to a mere temporary alignment of
interests), a community that would be completed only
through a "world state.1
11 7
The second function of the state is to ensure the contin-
ual breakdown of hierarchies and divisions within society and
to promote experiments in alternative forms of social, politi-
cal, and economic organization. The state would accomplish
this goal through the rotating capital fund, through its legal
counterpart, market rights, and through destabilization
rights. The latter would enlarge judicial powers of injunctive
relief and allow courts to more easily override existing laws
that reinforce social and economic inequalities.1 8 These
three mechanisms would redistribute large concentrations of
capital to those without as well as allow for open political de-
bate over matters generally considered free from political
scrutiny.
In expanding the scope of political scrutiny, Unger envi-
116. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 282.
117. Id. at 283-84.
118. CLS, supra note 11, at 602-14.
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sions a breakdown of the traditional public-private distinc-
tion, literally opening all areas of life to politics.119 The bish-
ops, too, reject the strict public-private distinction, but they
would not go so far as Unger in politicizing most areas of life,
including family life. 20 Unger does recognize that some areas
of life must remain autonomous, but even this autonomy
would not be absolute; rather it would be granted on a case-
by-case basis when necessary to protect individual freedom
and development.'
C. The Role of Government: Possibilities for Convergence
Unger and the bishops share two basic assumptions that
inform their theories of government. First, participation
through a decentralization of function and power is a funda-
mental substantive and procedural principle. Second, the po-
litical is the highest form of the social element of human na-
ture, and therefore, government plays an important role in
the common good and promoting distributive justice.
1. Subsidiarity and Empowered Democracy
As in other areas, Unger pushes the principle of partici-
pation through decentralization to its limits. The bishops ad-
vocate cooperative ownership and similar types of institution-
alized economic democracy, but they do not have a
comprehensive theory of organization to match Unger's the-
ory of organic groups. The bishops take a step toward decen-
tralized communitarian politics but they are far from advo-
cating the major deconstruction and restructuring of large-
scale bureaucratic organizations that is meant to be accom-
plished through Unger's organic groups, rotating capital
fund, and destabilization rights. They would largely limit to
119. The politicization of virtually all areas of life derives from Un-
ger's epistemology - institutions that reflect and develop authentic human
nature can only be known through a free and democratic process of moral
discernment - and from his theory of human nature - the social aspects
of human nature require an approximation of a universal political
community.
120. Unger's vision of law as a primary tool in the restructuring of
contemporary society "clings to the naive belief that the legal process
stands at the center of social life." Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 12,
at 1514. Unger virtually abolishes the distinction between state and society
which is so important to the bishops' theory of distributive justice. Only
Unger's organic groups prevent the state and society from becoming coter-
minous. See supra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.
121. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 274, 259-81.
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the family or well-defined government initiatives the kind of
distributive powers that Unger delegates to his organic
groups. Furthermore, because Unger so distrusts any forms
of inequality of wealth or power, as well as models of organi-
zation based on class or role, he is unwilling to tolerate the
kinds of large-scale economic organization that the bishops
quietly accept as in the nature of democratic capitalism. In
that respect, Unger takes the bishops' principle of sub-
sidiarity much more seriously than the bishops themselves.
2. The Limits of Government
Neither the bishops nor Unger accept the minimalist theory
of government or the strict distinction between the public
and private realms. Neither consider government merely a
necessary evil. While not naive about the dangers of govern-
mental power, both attribute to the government a moral
function of ultimate responsibility for attainment of the com-
mon good. For Unger, this primarily signals the destruction
of all forms of domination-especially economic domina-
tion-that would inhibit the development of the organic
groups. For the bishops, this primarily means that the gov-
ernment is the provider of last resort. Both the bishops and
Unger expect the government to play an important role in
ensuring that society provide basic necessities and protect ec-
onomic rights because neither the bishops nor Unger begin
with the presumption that the economic is distinct from the
political.
The major difference between Unger and the bishops is
not whether, but to what extent, the government may inter-
vene to promote distributive justice. The bishops are much
more reluctant to expose all of life to political conflict. They
do not even go so far as Unger in explicitly calling for estab-
lishing the right to basic necessities and other economic
rights as legal rights. This difference in views concerning the
degree of government intervention may be of such signifi-
cance as to make their theories of government irreconcilable.
Furthermore, since Unger relegates the precise definition of
his system of rights to the political process, he aggravates the
differences between himself and the bishops. Therefore, the
degree of intervention that he envisions remains less determi-
nate than the bishops would probably tolerate. Even in eco-
nomic affairs-which the bishops do not remove from politi-
cal intervention-they would not tolerate the kind of
comprehensive government intervention that Unger envi-
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sions. These differences aside, the bishops and Unger agree
on a fundamental principle that sharply distinguishes them
from liberal theorists. That is, they agree that the govern-
ment has an affirmative, moral, and ultimate role to play in
promoting distributive justice.
III. CONCLUSION
Can Unger's jurisprudence, as evidenced by his theory of
distributive justice, serve as a starting point for the develop-
ment of an American Catholic jurisprudence? The answer is
a qualified yes-perhaps a very qualified yes.
Certainly, the preceding analysis has shown a number of
areas of fundamental agreement. Both the bishops and Un-
ger base a mixed deontological-consequentialist theory of dis-
tributive justice in an authentic human nature, and in so do-
ing reject liberalism's strict distinction between fact and
value. Their theories of human nature converge in the criti-
cal notion that the person is fundamentally a social and politi-
cal being, and therefore, the right to basic necessities and
other economic rights are defined, not in individualistic
terms, but in terms of the integral development of the person
in community with others. Their social theories also con-
verge on the important notion that distributive justice cannot
be reduced to the mere utilitarian balancing of individual in-
terests. Rather, they stress human dignity and community as
the foundational norms of their theory of distributive justice.
Finally, both the bishops and Unger stress subsidiarity and
participation in all aspects of society as critical components of
their theories of government. Furthermore, they both reject
liberalism's minimalist view of government, stressing rather
the positive-indeed, moral-function of government in pro-
tecting economic rights.
But of course there are many important differences be-
tween the bishops and Unger. Unger is a far greater skeptic,
even if only a "soft" skeptic, than the bishops are likely to
tolerate. Even given the generally indeterminate nature of
the Church's social teachings compared to her personal ethic,
Unger's soft skepticism may be an insuperable problem. Due
to his skepticism, Unger's view of human nature is more exis-
tential than that of the bishops; it is also more positive. Un-
ger certainly recognizes sin in the world, but it is almost en-
tirely located in social and political institutions. The bishops
see far greater possibilities for social change through conver-
sion of hearts, although they also recognize the important
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role of social sin.
Another major difference with the bishops is Unger's
definition of distributive justice in essentially egalitarian
terms, that is, based primarily in need. Need plays an impor-
tant role in the bishops' theory to the extent that basic needs
remain unmet, whereas Unger adopts a more strictly egalita-
rian notion of need as the sole criterion for distribution of
goods. But both are concerned with reducing inequality in
order to foster the flourishing of community and the com-
mon good.
Finally, Unger is both more of a statist and more of an
anarchist than the bishops. He is more statist insofar as he
grants a greater role to government, especially in terms of
directing the economy and guaranteeing economic and cul-
tural rights. The bishops leave the latter largely to the realm
of developing a moral consensus that individuals have eco,
nomic rights and that the various actors in society-not only
the government-share responsibility in ensuring that these
rights are protected. Unger is more of an anarchist because
his existential and skeptical concern for context revision and
his corresponding destabilization rights envision a society far
more plastic than that of the bishops, who traditionally have
a great concern for social order.
Can we say then, "critical legal bishops"? Is Unger "very
Catholic" in his radical jurisprudence? The answer is a quali-
fied yes, but given the qualifications, might better be stated as
a "qualified no." But, perhaps the question, itself, is some-
what off the mark. First, given the nature of the bishops'
competence as teachers and pastors, they will never-if they
are doing their job and remaining faithful to the Gospel-be
identifiable with a single jurisprudential theory. Nevertheless,
some theories certainly are much more compatible with the
Church's social teachings than others. And it is partly the
role of the bishops, and moreso, the role of the Catholic laity,
to determine which legal theories and practices better re-
present the general norms of the social teachings. This paper
is one attempt to do this.
Second, this article is far too limited in scope to provide
anything but a qualified answer to this question. It has dealt
only with the issues preliminary to doing serious jurispruden-
tial analysis: aspects of the theories of knowledge, human na-
ture, society and government that underlie the bishops' and
Unger's notions of distributive justice. It has not even begun
the next step of discussing particular jurisprudential issues,
such as what components of their theories of distributive jus-
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tice, if any, should properly be embodied in law-that is, the
relationship between law and morality, and whether private
or public law is the proper realm for implementing such dis-
tributive principles. Nor has it discussed whether their no-
tions of distributive justice are compatible with United States
constitutional, statutory and common law. And it has not ana-
lyzed whether jurisprudential theories other than Unger's
might be more compatible with the Church's social teachings.
Finally, it has not determined about which of these more par-
ticular jurisprudential issues Catholic social teaching has any-
thing to say, and which involve prudential moral and non-
moral judgments to which the bishops do not and should not
speak.
Nevertheless, this paper has attempted to show that
there is much in Unger's basic theory of distributive justice
that warrants pursuing a comparison of other aspects of his
epistemology and social and political theory, as well as the
more specific jurisprudential issues mentioned above. Cer-
tainly the Church's social teachings cannot be identified ex-
clusively with a particular jurisprudence, and Unger's may
not be as compatible as other contemporary jurisprudential
theories. Nonetheless, considering the extent to which Unger
and his Critical Legal Studies colleagues have been ostracized
by many legal scholars, it is both surprising and significant
that such a "radical" has so many important principles in
common with the bishops. It suggests both that Unger really
is not as radical as he may seem and that the bishops are far
more radical than many would like to admit, particularly in
the priority they give to need, economic participation, soli-
darity, and relative equality in their theory of distributive
justice.
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